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1. Introduction 
 Academic publishing has received attention is several articles in recent years. A few 
studies considered the pricing of academic journals (e.g. Bergstrom, 2001 and McCabe, 2002), 
while others focused on various aspects of the review process, for example payment to referees 
(Engers and Gans, 1998; Chang and Lai, 2001), the value-added from the review process 
(Laband, 1990), and the increase in the number and the extent of revisions requested prior to 
publication, which also increases the submit-accept time (Ellison, 2002a; 2002b). This trend is an 
acknowledgement that research on the academic review process is not only interesting, but is 
also very important, because knowing more about the process and understanding it better may 
suggest how it can be improved, enhancing the productivity of economists and scholars in other 
disciplines.  
 One of the most criticized aspects of the review process is the long delay in publication it 
creates. The most important part of the editorial delay is the first response time (the time from 
submission to first editorial decision, henceforth FRT): while most articles go through rounds of 
revisions and the delay from acceptance to publication only in the journal that publishes the 
article, the FRT is imposed on the article also in any journal that rejects it. Azar (2004a), for 
example, estimates that the average article is submitted (and therefore suffers from the FRT) 3-6 
times prior to publication. 
 A recent article (Azar, 2004b) suggests that the FRT of economics journals increased 
from about 2 months 40 years ago to 3-6 months today. Interestingly, Azar argues that the 
optimal FRT has also increased during this period. He explains that the optimal FRT is not zero, 
because the delay caused by the FRT deters submissions of mediocre papers to good journals, 
and thus a longer FRT reduces the costs of the review process (mainly the cost of referees’ and 
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editors’ time).2 The optimal FRT is determined according to the trade-off between reducing the 
review process costs and disseminating new research quickly. 3 Azar claims that because new 
research today is often available as a working paper on the Internet even before publication in a 
journal, it became less important from a social perspective to publish new research quickly in 
journals. Moreover, because papers today are longer and more mathematical than in the past, 
refereeing them is more costly, and therefore it became more important to deter frivolous 
submissions. Azar explains that these two changes have increased the optimal FRT.  
 The fact that both the actual and the optimal FRT increased during the same period raises 
several interesting questions. Did referees or editors think (consciously or not) about the optimal 
FRT, and therefore the actual FRT increased together with the optimal FRT? What if some 
referees do not care about the optimal FRT – are they also slower today than 40 years ago? If 
referees follow a social norm in deciding how quickly to referee a paper, will this increase social 
welfare or not? I address these questions and some other related questions using a model in 
which referees care about several different things: the optimal FRT, the social norm about how 
quickly a referee should respond, and their own personal preferences. I allow for heterogeneity 
among referees in several dimensions and I analyze how the social norm evolves over time, in 
particular when there is also an external change in the environment (e.g. an increase in the 
optimal FRT). The model suggests the surprising result that even when the social norm changes 
in a welfare-improving way, its existence may reduce welfare.  
                                                 
2 Azar (2006), however, offers a few ideas how the FRT can be shortened without increasing the costs of the review 
process.  
3 For a detailed analysis of the optimal FRT (and the optimal submission strategy of the author) see Azar (2005).  
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 While the discussion focuses on the review process, the model is more general and can be 
applied to other contexts as well, thus contributing to the literature on the evolution of social 
norms (see for example Sethi (1996) for an evolutionary model of social norms, Sethi and 
Somanathan (1996) for an evolutionary model in the context of common property resource use, 
and Azar (2004c) for a model which is applied to analysis of the tipping norm). I discuss briefly 
two examples of other norms that can be analyzed using the model: workplace norms, and norms 
of proper dress.  
 The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses potential reasons for 
the increase in the FRT over the years. Section 3 presents a model of the evolution of social 
norms applied to the refereeing context. The model is applicable to a broad range of social 
norms; Section 4 discusses briefly two examples. Section 5 discusses three additional questions 
regarding the FRT, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Slowdown in First Response Times of Economics Journals 
 Azar (2004b) suggests that the FRT grew from about 2 months circa 1960 to about 3-6 
months today. What has changed over the last 40 years that could increase the FRT so much? 
Technology obviously advanced significantly, but should have the opposite effect – to shorten 
the FRT. With the software that exists today, it is easier to detect papers that spend too much 
time in the referee’s hands. E-mail and faxes can be used for certain tasks and are faster than 
mail. Electronic submissions were adopted by various journals and allow to eliminate the mailing 
delays. 
 Ellison (2002a) documents an increase in the submit-accept time of economics journals 
and considers several potential reasons for it, some of which may also explain a longer FRT (e.g. 
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papers becoming longer and more complex). His empirical analysis, however, leads him to 
conclude (p. 989), “What I find most striking in the data is how hard it seems to be to find 
substantial differences between the economics profession now and the economics profession in 
1970. The profession is not much larger. It does not appear to be much more democratic. I 
cannot find the increasing specialization that I would have expected if economic research were 
really much harder and more complex than it was 30 years ago.” Consequently, these issues also 
do not seem to be the reason for the slowdown in the FRT.  
 Papers have become longer over the last few decades (see Ellison, 2002a; 2002b), and 
this may increase the time needed to referee a paper. But refereeing most papers requires only a 
few hours. Hamermesh (1994), for example, suggests that it takes six hours to referee an average 
paper. The Canadian Journal of Economics provides advice to referees in which it states “The 
amount of time taken with a paper can vary enormously – anything from a couple of hours to a 
couple of days of full-time effort. A typical report should probably take 3 or 4 hours.”4 Assume 
that today it takes on average five hours to referee a paper. No matter how little time it took to 
referee a paper forty years ago, a few more hours required for the task today cannot justify an 
increase of about three months in the FRT.  
 The FRT consists of the time it takes the editor to choose referees, the mailing time to 
and from the referees, the time it takes the referees to write the reports, and the time it takes the 
editor to make a decision based on these reports. The main component of the long FRT today is 
the time the paper spends in the hands of referees. But it takes many referees a few months to 
write a report not because they ponder about the importance of the paper for several months, but 
because the paper waits a long time unread. In Franklin Fisher’s words, “Such a paper is delayed 
                                                 
4 See on-line at http://economics.ca/cje/en/referees.php. 
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not because a referee is taking three months to decide on it but because it is sitting in a pile on 
his or her desk” (Shepherd, 1995, p. 103). Why do referees leave papers in the pile for more time 
today than in the past? I suggest two reasons: because the social norm of how much time it 
should take to referee a paper has increased, and because the optimal FRT is longer today.  
 The explanation why the optimal FRT has increased over the years was briefly discussed 
in the introduction and appears in more detail in Azar (2004b). We might wonder how the 
optimal FRT translates into referees’ behavior. Does it require that referees will compute the 
optimal FRT or think about it explicitly? The answer is no, just as people might behave as if they 
are utility maximizers even without actually solving a utility maximization problem. For 
example, one of the two changes that increased the optimal FRT is the higher availability of 
working papers today. Even without thinking explicitly about the optimal FRT, referees in the 
past might have felt very guilty when it took them a long time to write their referee report 
because they knew they were delaying the dissemination of this new research. Today, referees 
know that the paper is probably already available on the Internet, and therefore they might feel 
less guilty when delaying the review process.  
 Why are social norms related to the refereeing time (the time the paper spends in the 
referee’s hands)? The refereeing time can be thought of as a social norm because when referees 
contemplate how quickly they should send their report, they consider, directly and indirectly, 
how quickly others write referee reports.5 That is, the refereeing time is affected by the norm 
                                                 
5 The indirect effect is that the editor’s expectations from the referee (and a major expectation deals with how 
quickly the report should be returned) are based on the behavior of other referees. Meeting the editor’s expectations 
is important to referees for several reasons. First, the referee might feel irresponsible and uncomfortable when he is 
much slower than others. Second, the editor may be asked to write a reference letter about the referee in the future 
 6 
about how much time it takes to referee a paper.6 Most referees today do not feel especially 
embarrassed or guilty to send reports after three months, knowing that this is the time it takes 
many other referees as well. But a few decades ago, when most referees responded within a few 
weeks, it probably was much more embarrassing to send referee reports only after three months. 
Comparison to other referees works also in the other direction: some referees may not want to be 
faster than others, to avoid receiving too many refereeing requests (see Thomson, 2001, p. 116).  
 Obviously, if referees change their behavior because the optimal FRT has changed, this 
also affects the social norm about how much time refereeing should take. The change in the 
norm further affects referees’ behavior, so the norm changes again and so on. In what follows, I 
introduce a dynamic model that describes the evolution of the social norm about refereeing time 
and analyzes how the behavior of referees and the norm change when there are changes in the 
environment (e.g. an increase in the optimal FRT).  
                                                                                                                                                             
when the referee is up for tenure or promotion Third, the treatment of the referee when he submits articles to the 
journal may be affected by the editor’s opinion of him. Bad papers will be rejected anyway, but the decision about 
marginal papers may be influenced (consciously or not) by the editor’s opinion of the author. Not only the editorial 
decision, but also the choice of referees, may be affected by the reputation of the author as a referee. The Journal of 
Finance even announced that the latter has been the journal’s policy: “We record both the time the reviewer took 
and the quality of the review. The quality of the author as a reviewer is a strong influence on our decision of to 
whom we will send the manuscript. Once again, the best way to ensure a good review is to be a good reviewer when 
called upon” (Elton and Gruber, 1987). 
6 See also Ellison (2002a, p. 984), who writes: “I use the term “social norms” to refer to the idea that the publication 
process may be fairly arbitrary: editors and referees could simply be doing what conventions dictate one does with 
submissions.” 
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3. The Evolution of the Social Norm of Refereeing Time 
 Let us think about a referee who receives a paper to referee, puts it aside for some time, 
and then reads it and writes the report. The factors that affect the refereeing time chosen by the 
referee (denoted by r) can be divided to three: the social norm about how long it should take to 
referee a paper, the optimal delay (denoted by D*), and all other factors.7 These other factors 
include how busy the referee is, how much he tends to procrastinate, whether the paper interests 
him, and so on; I denote the delay that the referee would choose if these were the only factors by 
v (“various factors”), which may differ across referees. The preferred refereeing time from the 
referee’s perspective (ignoring the social norm for the moment) is denoted by p, and is equal to a 
weighted average between D* and v:  
( 1 )     p = wD* + (1 − w)v. 
The weight given to the optimal delay, w ∈ [0, 1], may be different across referees. Referees 
who do not care at all about the optimal delay correspond to w = 0, for example. Notice that 
while p, w and v are potentially different across referees, D* is the same for everyone.8  
 The relative importance of the social norm for each referee is measured by m, where 0 ≤ 
m < 1. The values of m, p, v, and w represent the referee’s personality and concerns and are 
exogenous. The referee only chooses the refereeing delay, r. The desire of the referee to choose a 
                                                 
7 The optimal delay is the optimal refereeing time (from a social perspective). It equals the optimal FRT minus the 
time that the paper spends in the editor’s hands and in the mail to and from the referee. A longer optimal FRT 
therefore increases also the optimal delay.  
8 The notation also makes it easy to remember which variables are potentially heterogeneous: capital letters denote 
variables that are the same for all referees and small letters denote variables that may be different across referees.  
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refereeing delay that is close to p on one hand, but also close to the norm in period t (denoted by 
Nt) on the other hand, is expresses in the following utility function: 
( 2 )   u(r; p, m, Nt) = − m(r − Nt)2 − (1 − m)(r − p)2. 
 Taking the first-order condition of the utility maximization problem and rearranging 
suggests that the optimal choice of r in period t (denoted rt) is given by the weighted average of p 
and Nt: 
( 3 )   rt = mNt + (1 − m)p = mNt + (1 − m)[wD* + (1 − w)v]. 
 The social norm in period 0 is arbitrarily determined and denoted as N0, and afterwards it 
evolves as follows: the norm in period t ≥ 1 is equal to a weighted average of the norm in the 
previous period and the average refereeing delay in the previous period. That is,  
( 4 )     Nt = zNt−1 + (1 − z)E(rt−1), 
where E(rt−1) is the average of r (over all the referees) in period t−1 and z is a parameter 
satisfying 0 ≤ z < 1. To examine how changes in the environment affect the long-run social 
norm, we should find the equilibrium level of the norm. One possible definition for the 
equilibrium level of the norm is the level to which the norm converges. An alternative definition 
is the value N such that if Nt = N then Nt+1 = N. The following proposition suggests that the two 
definitions are equivalent, and also computes the equilibrium level of the norm, which I refer to 
also as the “stable norm” or N∞.  
 Proposition 1: The social norm converges to N∞ ≡ E[(1 − m)p] / [1 − E(m)]= E(p) − 
cov(m, p)/[1 − E(m)], where cov (m, p) is the covariance of m and p over all the referees, and 
similarly for E(m) and E[(1−m)p]. Moreover, if Nt = N∞, then Nt+1 = N∞,, implying that if the 
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norm is equal to N∞  it does not change anymore as long as the environment (the distribution and 
preferences of referees, the optimal delay, etc.) remains the same.  
 Proof: Using equations ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) we get Nt = zNt−1 + (1 − z)E(rt−1) = zNt−1 + (1 − 
z)E[mNt−1 + (1 − m)p] = Nt−1[z + (1 − z)E(m)] + (1 − z)E[(1 − m)p]. Since this is true for all t, as 
long as t is large enough, we can express Nt−1 as a function of Nt−2, and then Nt−2 as a function of 
Nt−3 and so on. For notational convenience, let us define first x = z + (1 − z)E(m) and y = (1 − 
z)E[(1 − m)p]. It then follows that Nt = xNt−1 + y = x(xNt−2 + y) + y = x[x(xNt−3 + y) + y] + y = 
… Continuing in this fashion establishes that for any integer k such that k ≤ t we have: 
( 5 )    Nt = xkNt−k + y(1 + x + x2 + … xk−1).  
 To proceed, notice that x can be thought of as a weighted average of 1 and E(m), with a 
strictly positive weight given to E(m) (a weight of 1−z, and recall that 0 ≤ z < 1). Since m ∈ [0, 
1), it follows that E(m) ∈ [0, 1) and therefore x ∈ [0, 1). As t → ∞, the equation is true for values 
of k that approach infinity, implying that xk → 0 and that the expression in parentheses 
approaches 1/(1 − x). Using these observations and substituting for x and y we then obtain: 
lim t→∞ Nt ≡ N∞ = y / (1 − x) = (1 − z)E[(1 − m)p] / [1 − z − (1 − z)E(m)] = (1 − z)E[(1 − m)p] / 
(1 − z)[1 − E(m)] = E[(1 − m)p] / [1 − E(m)]. Rearranging, substituting E(mp) = cov (m, p) + 
E(m)E(p), and then simplifying, shows that this expression is equal to E(p) − cov(m, p)/[1 − 
E(m)]. To see that if Nt = N∞ then Nt+1 = N∞ it is again simpler to use the definitions of x and y. 
Notice that Nt+1 = xNt + y = xN∞ + y = xy/(1 − x) + y = [xy/(1 − x)] + [y(1−x)/(1−x)] = y[x + (1 
− x)]/(1 − x) = y/(1 − x) = N∞.        Q.E.D. 
 Proposition 1 suggests that we have a well-defined notion of equilibrium in the model, 
since the norm converges to a unique value. Notice that the value of z does not affect the stable 
 10 
norm; it does affect the speed of convergence, however. The result that the stable norm equals 
E(p) − cov(m, p)/[1 − E(m)] has an interesting intuition. In the absence of a social norm, each 
referee chooses a delay equal to his p and therefore the average refereeing time is equal to E(p). 
With a social norm, the average refereeing time (which is also the norm) is higher than E(p) if 
and only if cov(m, p) < 0 (since E(m) < 1). The intuition why this holds is that people with a low 
m put a little weight on the norm and a high weight on their own preference (p). Consequently, 
cov (m, p) < 0 implies that those with a high p care less about the norm than those with a low p; 
as a result, those with a high p affect the others more than the others affect them (through the 
social norm). Therefore the average refereeing time is higher than in the absence of a social norm 
– higher than E(p). The intuition why cov (m, p) > 0 implies that N∞ < E(p) follows a similar 
argument.  
 A natural question is whether the stable norm is higher, lower, or equal to the optimal 
delay. The following proposition suggests a simple expression that determines whether the stable 
norm is higher than the optimal delay: 
 Proposition 2: The value of (N∞ − D*) is equal to E[(1 − m)(1 − w)(v − D*)]/[1 − E(m)]. It 
follows that the sign of (N∞ − D*) is the same as the sign of E[(1 − m)(1 − w)(v − D*)].  
Proof: Using Proposition 1 and substituting for p from equation ( 1 ) we get that N∞ − D* 
= E{(1 − m)[v(1 − w) + D*w]}/[1 − E(m)] − D*. Rearranging this expression then yields {E[(1 − 
m)v(1 − w)] + D*[E(w) − E(mw) − 1 + E(m)]}/[1 − E(m)], which after further simplification 
becomes E[(1 − m)(1 − w)(v − D*)]/[1 − E(m)]. Since m ∈ [0, 1), the denominator is strictly 
positive, so the sign of (N∞ − D*) is equal to the sign of the numerator.    Q.E.D. 
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 Proposition 2 shows that E(v) = D* does not guarantee that the stable norm is equal to the 
optimal delay. It also suggests that higher values of v make it more likely that the stable norm is 
higher than the optimal delay, and vice versa. In particular, if v ≥ D* for all referees, then N∞ ≥ 
D*, and vice versa. In addition, (N∞ − D*) is strictly increasing in the value of v of any referee for 
whom w < 1. This implies that from a social-welfare perspective, if the stable norm is higher 
than the optimal delay, we would like to reduce the values of v of the referees. There are various 
ways to reduce the value of v, for example to pay referees for a report that is written in a short 
time. It is worth pointing out that  
 An interesting question to ask is how a change in the environment affects the stable norm. 
In particular, what is the effect of an increase in the optimal delay on the social norm? How does 
it affect individual referees? The following proposition answers these questions. 
 Proposition 3: (i) A change in D* from D*0 to D*1 changes the stable norm by (D*1 − 
D*0)E[(1 − m)w] / [1 − E(m)]. This implies that if no referee cares about the optimal delay (w = 
0 for all referees), then a change in D* does not affect the stable norm. Otherwise, the stable 
norm changes in the same direction as the change in D*. If w < 1 for at least one referee, then 
the change in the norm is smaller than the change in D*.  
 (ii) Assume that at least some referees care about the optimal delay. Then, every referee 
will change his choice of r in the direction of the change in D*, except for referees who do not 
care about the norm (m = 0) and also do not care about the optimal delay (w = 0), who do not 
change their choice of r.  
 Proof: (i) We want to compare the stable norm before and after the change in D*, 
assuming that all other parameters (m, v, and w) are unchanged (p is changed because it is a 
function of D*). Denote the stable norm before and after the change in the optimal delay as N∞0 
 12 
and N∞1, respectively. Similarly, denote the values of p before and after the change as p0 and p1 
(each referee may have different values of p0 and p1, however). Using Proposition 1 and equation 
( 1 ) and rearranging we get: N∞1 − N∞0 = E[(1 − m)(p1 − p0)] / [1 − E(m)] = E[(1 − m)w(D*1 − 
D*0)] / [1 − E(m)] = (D*1 − D*0)E[(1 − m)w] / [1 − E(m)]. Since m ∈ [0, 1), the denominator is 
strictly positive, and so is the term (1 − m) in the expectation in the numerator. If w = 0 for all 
referees, the numerator is equal to zero, implying that the stable norm does not change. If w > 0 
for at least one referee, however, the numerator has the same sign as (D*1 − D*0), implying that 
the norm changes in the same direction as the change in the optimal delay. To see that the change 
in the norm is smaller than the change in D*, notice that since (1 − m) is strictly positive and w is 
smaller than 1 for at least one referee, it follows that E[(1 − m)w] < E[(1 − m)*1] = 1 − E(m) and 
the change in the stable norm is strictly smaller than the change in D*.  
(ii) Recall from equation ( 3 ) that rt = mNt + (1 − m)[wD* + (1 − w)v]. Denote the choice of r 
with a stable norm before and after the change in D* as r∞0 and r∞1. It follows that r∞1 − r∞0 = 
m(N∞1 − N∞0) + (1 − m)w(D*1 − D*0) = m(D*1 − D*0)E[(1 − m)w] / [1 − E(m)] + (1 − m)w(D*1 − 
D*0) = (D*1 − D*0){mE[(1 − m)w] / [1 − E(m)] + (1 − m)w}.9 Since the assumption in this part is 
that some referees care about the optimal delay (w > 0), it follows that E[(1 − m)w] > 0. Since m 
∈ [0, 1) and w ∈ [0, 1], it follows that (r∞1 − r∞0) has the same sign as (D*1 − D*0), unless both m 
= 0 and w = 0 (in this latter case, r∞1 − r∞0 = 0).      Q.E.D. 
 Part (i) of Proposition 3 suggests that it is sufficient that at least one referee cares about 
the profession’s welfare (and therefore about the optimal delay) in order for the social norm to 
                                                 
9 Recall that m and w are the specific parameters of the individual referee, whereas E[(1 − m)w] and E(m) are the 
expectations over the entire population of referees. 
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change in the direction of the optimal delay. Since the optimal delay increased in the last few 
decades, Proposition 3 provides a potential explanation why the social norm, or the mean 
refereeing time, increased as well.  
 In addition, since the social norm increases in the period following the change in the 
optimal delay, referees further increase their delay, the norm increases even further and so on. 
Despite this recurring increase in the norm, however, the proposition tells us that the overall 
increase in the norm is still smaller than the change in the optimal delay (with w < 1 for at least 
one referee). Part (ii) of Proposition 3 implies that even referees who do not care about the 
optimal delay (w = 0) increased their refereeing time because of the change in the social norm, 
except for the extreme case in which they do not care at all also about the norm.  
 It seems that the social norm is a mechanism that reinforces the tendency of referees to 
change their behavior in the direction of the change in the optimal delay. For example, suppose 
that the optimal delay increases. Referees change their preferences toward a higher delay (p 
increases because D* increases). This implies that referees choose higher values of r; doing so 
increases the norm, which further increases the values of r chosen by the referees and so on. It 
seems that the existence of the social norm magnifies the increase in the average refereeing time 
(which is by definition the stable norm). The following proposition suggests the surprising result 
that this is not necessarily true.  
 Proposition 4: Assume that the optimal delay changed, and denote the change by ∆D* 
(which is positive if D* increased and vice versa). Denote the change in the stable norm if 
referees do not care about the norm (m = 0 for everyone) as ∆Nm=0 and the change in the stable 
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norm when referees care about the norm as ∆Nm>0 (the distribution of w remains the same).10 We 
then have ∆Nm=0 − ∆Nm>0 = cov (m, w)∆D*/[1 − E(m)], implying that the sign of (∆Nm=0 − 
∆Nm>0) is the same as the sign of [cov (m, w)∆D*], where cov (m, w) is computed when referees 
care about the norm (when they do not the covariance is 0 since m = 0 for all referees). 
 Proof: Using Proposition 3 and substituting m = 0 and E(m) = 0 when referees do not 
care about the norm, we get that ∆Nm=0 − ∆Nm>0 = ∆D*E(w) − ∆D*E[(1 − m)w]/[1 − E(m)] = 
∆D*{E(w)[1 − E(m)] − E[(1 − m)w]}/[1 − E(m)] = ∆D*[E(mw) − E(w)E(m)] /[1 − E(m)] = cov 
(m, w)∆D*/[1 − E(m)], where all the expressions involving m refer to the case in which referees 
care about the norm (m = 0 was already substituted for the other case). The fact that E(m) ∈ [0, 
1) completes the proof.         Q.E.D. 
 Since the norm changes in the direction of ∆D* (see Proposition 3), Proposition 4 
suggests the surprising result that when cov (m, w) > 0, the stable norm changes more when 
referees do not care about the norm (whether ∆D* is positive or negative). The intuition for this 
                                                 
10 Some readers may find the term “the average delay in the long run when there is no social norm” more intuitive 
than “the stable norm if referees do not care about the norm.” The two expressions, however, are equivalent, since 
the stable norm is by definition the average delay (in the long run) and “no social norm” is equivalent to the case in 
which there is a norm but m = 0 for all referees. The latter equivalency is intuitive, and can also be seen formally: if 
no social norm exists, each referee chooses a delay equal to his value of p (to see this, maximize the utility function 
in ( 2 ) after eliminating the first term, which includes the norm), and the average delay is E(p). If we use the 
framework developed so far and substitute m = 0 and E(m) = 0 in Proposition 1, we also get N∞ = E(p). I find it 
more convenient to stick to the established framework and substitute m = 0, and therefore I use the somewhat 
counter-intuitive term “the stable norm if referees do not care about the norm.” 
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result is as follows (assume, without loss of generality, that the optimal delay increased; the same 
idea is true when it decreased): when referees care about the norm, the norm indeed increases the 
delay of those who do not care much about the optimal delay. At the same time, however, since 
the norm is affected by those who do not care about the optimal delay, the norm reduces the 
delay of those who care about the optimal delay. These two effects of the norm act in opposite 
direction on the average delay, and which one dominates depends on cov (m, w). When cov (m, 
w) > 0, it implies that generally, those who care a lot about the optimal delay (high value of w) 
also care more about the norm (high value of m). Since they care more about the norm, they are 
more affected by the others than they affect the others, leading the average delay to increase less 
than if no one cared about the norm.  
 An interesting question is whether the existence of the social norm improves social 
welfare. Non-existence of the norm is equivalent to assuming m = 0 for all referees; the stable 
norm is useful because it equals the average delay, but the norm has no effect on the behavior of 
individual referees (see the last footnote). Let the subscripts m>0 and m=0 denote the cases 
where referees care or do not care about the norm, respectively (as in Proposition 4), and denote 
the absolute value of (v − D*) by |v − D*|. The next proposition describes the effect of the norm 
on social welfare (denoted by W): 
 Proposition 5: Assume that W is strictly concave in the delay and that either W is 
symmetric in d, or that (N∞ − D*)m>0 and (N∞ − D*)m=0 have the same sign. Welfare is then higher 
when referees care about the social norm if and only if cov [m, (1 − w)|v − D*|] > 0; welfare is 
lower when referees care about the social norm if and only if cov [m, (1 − w)|v − D*|] < 0.   
 Proof: Since W is concave in the delay, a higher deviation (in absolute value) of N∞ from 
D* implies lower welfare if either (i) W is symmetric in d, or (ii) the two deviations are in the 
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same direction. If at least one of these conditions is met, then welfare is higher when referees 
care about the social norm if and only if |N∞ − D*|m=0 − |N∞ − D*|m>0 > 0 (and welfare is lower 
when referees care about the social norm when this expression is negative). Using Proposition 2, 
substituting m = 0 in the case when referees do not care about the norm and rearranging yields 
that |N∞ − D*|m=0 − |N∞ − D*|m>0 = E[(1 − w)|v − D*|] − E[(1 − m)(1 − w)|v − D*|]/[1 − E(m)] = 
{[1 − E(m)]E[(1 − w)|v − D*|] − E[(1 − m)(1 − w)|v − D*|]}/[1 − E(m)] = {E[m(1 − w)|v − D*|] − 
E(m)E[(1 − w)|v − D*|]}/[1 − E(m)] = cov [m, (1 − w)|v − D*|]/[1 − E(m)]. The proposition then 
follows immediately from 0 ≤ E(m) < 1.        Q.E.D. 
 Proposition 5 suggests that the social norm can increase or decrease social welfare, 
depending on the characteristics of referees (the distribution of m, w, and v). Other things being 
equal, welfare is likely to be improved by the social norm when relatively high values of m are 
associated with relatively low values of w (relative to the distributions of m and w). In particular, 
if v is the same for all referees (and different from D*), the condition for the social norm to be 
welfare improving becomes cov (m, w) < 0. The intuition is similar to the one discussed before. 
Referees improve welfare more the closer their personal preference is to the optimal delay, 
which happens when they have high values of w. The social norm creates two opposite effects: 
the “bad” referees (whose w-value is low and therefore their preferred delay is far from the 
optimal delay) affect the “good” referees (high w-values) negatively, but the good referees affect 
the bad referees positively. The positive effect dominates when the good referees are less 
affected by the social norm than their bad colleagues. Since m measures the effect of the norm, 
this means that high values of w are associated with low values of m, or cov (m, w) < 0. 
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4. Additional Applications of the Model 
 While the model is used here to discuss the review process, it has many other 
applications. One example is that of workplace norms. Workers are often affected by the effort 
level of other workers around them, either because it gives them an idea of what is considered 
appropriate and they feel guilt if they are much lazier than their colleagues, or because of direct 
peer pressure. Pressure can go either way: if workers receive a bonus that depends on the firm’s 
profits, the pressure is to work hard. If workers are afraid that they will be measured in 
comparison to the most productive workers (and especially if a quota or a pay-for-performance 
scheme is determined according to the achievements of the best workers), the pressure is not to 
work too hard.  
 The assumption that the social norm enters the utility function is therefore reasonable in 
the context of the workplace. What about the rest of the model? Clearly, workers have additional 
characteristics that determine how hard they want to work, and there is heterogeneity in these 
characteristics. One alternative to apply the model is to think about the hard workers as those 
who care more about the level of effort that is optimal for the firm. Naturally, this level (D*) is 
higher than the level implied by the worker’s various other reasons (v), implying that workers 
who care more about what is optimal for the firm (higher w) have a personal preference for a 
higher effort level (higher p). But we can also use a simplified version of the model, assuming 
that no one cares about what is optimal for the firm (w = 0). It then follows that p = v, but since 
the model allows v to vary across agents, we can still capture worker heterogeneity (in desired 
effort) in our analysis.  
 Proposition 2 now suggests that the average effort level is lower than the optimal effort 
level for the firm (because v < D* for everyone). Proposition 1 suggests that when cov (m, p) < 0, 
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the social norm increases the average effort level, thus increasing the firm’s profit. The intuition 
is that cov (m, p) < 0 means that those who work harder (high p) are in general less affected by 
the norm (low m). Consequently, the effect of the good workers on the bad workers is stronger 
than the opposite effect. The opposite occurs when cov (m, p) > 0. One implication of the model 
is that the firm should prefer a worker that is not affected by others if he is a hard worker by his 
nature, but a worker who is affected by his colleagues if he is a relatively lazy worker.  
 Moreover, the insights of the model apply also when there is no optimal action at all. For 
example, consider dressing norms, and suppose that there are two types of people: those who 
prefer to dress elegantly, and those who prefer to dress simply (because it is cheaper or more 
convenient, for example). Everyone, however, is also concerned by the norm and suffers some 
disutility that increases as his deviation from the norm increases, as in the model (assume that 
elegancy of dress is a continuous variable; the norm is the average choice of elegancy). By the 
same analysis as in the model, if the elegancy lovers are concerned about the norm more than the 




5.1. The Optimal First Response Time in Different Disciplines 
There are several interesting questions about the optimal FRT and the evolution of the 
refereeing delay that I want to address below. 11  The first question is why in many other 
disciplines the FRT is much shorter than in economics. As an example, let me take the case of 
physics. While in economics the average FRT is a few months, in physics it is a few weeks. 
Suppose that the optimal FRT in economics is indeed a few months, because the long FRT 
prevents submissions of mediocre papers to good journals and therefore reduces the costs of the 
review process (for further discussion of the optimal FRT in economics see Azar, 2005). Can we 
infer that the FRT in physics is much shorter than optimal?  
The answer is no. The disciplines are different in many important ways, and these 
differences result in a different optimal FRT. One of the main determinants of the optimal FRT is 
the social cost associated with delaying the publication of new research. This cost is lower today 
than in the past because of the availability of working papers on the Internet. The cost was not 
eliminated, however, because not all research is posted on the Internet, and because the 
certification of quality that journals offer is important: the signal they provide allows readers to 
save their scarce time for reading only the best research. This social cost is higher in disciplines 
in which published research affects further research more rapidly (let us call these “immediate” 
disciplines). If research today uses mostly findings from research conducted a few months ago, 
                                                 
11 I thank the Editor, J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., for suggesting these questions; I present here a short discussion of these 
questions, but the questions are important enough to justify a fuller treatment in separate articles and are therefore 
also offered as interesting topics for future research. 
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then it is much more important to disseminate new research quickly than if research today is 
based on previous research conducted 15 years ago. Is physics a more immediate discipline than 
economics? 
The answer is unambiguously yes. Journal Citation Reports (JCR) of Thomson ISI 
records data on citations in various journals and disciplines. JCR includes 8 different sub-
disciplines of physics, which I aggregated by summing the number of citations, journals, and 
articles, and averaging the immediacy index and the cited half-life index. Table 1 compares 
economics and physics, based on the data in JCR of 2004.  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Economics and Physics 










Economics 148,130 7,490 19.8 172 0.139 > 10.0 
Physics 2,055,985 95,635 21.5 285 0.502 6.7 
 
The two measures that indicate immediacy of a discipline are the immediacy index and 
the cited half-life number. The immediacy index is the average number of times an article is 
cited in the year it is published, and it indicates how quickly articles in the subject category are 
cited. If in one discipline papers are cited much more (per article) than in another, this can also 
increase its immediacy index, but we can see in the “Cites / articles” column that each article is 
cited on average a similar number of times in both disciplines. Physics, however, has an 
immediacy index which is about 3.6 times that of economics, indicating that physics is a much 
more immediate discipline.  
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Another measure that shows this is the cited half-life. JCR explains that “The cited half-
life for the category is the median age of its articles cited in the current JCR year. Half of the 
citations to the category are to articles published within the cited half-life.” In economics the 
median cited article was over 10 years old; in physics it was 6.7 years old.12 These two findings 
suggest that in physics new research is used as the background for further research much more 
quickly than in economics. Consequently, in physics the social cost of delaying publication of 
new research is higher, and the optimal FRT is lower. 
Another important determinant of the optimal FRT is the cost of the review process, 
which is mostly the time of editors and referees involved in the process. I am aware of no hard 
data on how much time a referee spends on a paper, but a reasonable conjecture is that a longer 
paper requires more hours of work. Table 2 presents data about the average article length in 
several top journals in economics and physics.  
 
                                                 
12 The highest category for cited half-life in JCR is “>10.0 years”, so an exact number is not available in economics, 
but the median is only slightly above 10 years, because the last 10 years account for 49.76% of the citations in 
economics. 
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Table 2: Article Length in Top Journals in Economics and Physics 
Economics Journals Average length Physics Journals Average length 
American Economic Review a  19.3 Physical Review B 7.2 
Econometrica 31.1 Journal of Chemical Physics 8.7 
Journal of Political Economy 29.9 Journal of Applied Physics 6.5 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 39.6 Physical Review D 10.6 
Review of Economic Studies 25.8 Physical Review A 7.0 
Average 29.1 Average 8.0 
a Not including Papers and Proceedings. 
 
Because in economics papers are much longer than in physics, it means that the social 
cost of a submission is higher in economics, because the referees are likely to need more time to 
read the paper. As a result, it is much more important to deter frivolous submissions in 
economics than in physics, once again resulting in a higher optimal FRT in economics. 
Consequently, even if in economics the optimal FRT is a few months, it is possible that in 
physics the optimal FRT is a few weeks.  
5.2. First Response Times and Untenured Faculty 
A second intriguing issue is the effect of the FRT on untenured professors and on the 
tenure process in general. The common wisdom is that the people who get hurt the most from the 
current long FRTs in economics are untenured faculty. They must obtain a certain number of 
publications in order to get tenure, and the long delays in the publication process (especially the 
FRT, which can delay the same paper several times, if the paper is rejected from a few journals 
first) make it hard for them to publish enough before the tenure decision. I want to challenge this 
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common wisdom and claim that getting tenure is not harder because of the long FRTs in 
economics; nevertheless, I will explain why the long FRTs do have adverse effects on untenured 
faculty and in the tenure process more generally. 
The reason why long FRTs do not make it harder to get tenure is essentially that the 
tenure decision is a tournament. The candidate to be tenured has to show that given the quality of 
the institution he works at, his publication record is satisfactory. What determines how many 
publications (and in which journals) are sufficient to be considered satisfactory? A comparison to 
other young researchers at the institution and elsewhere does. So the tenure process is essentially 
a competition among untenured faculty. The best ones get tenure at the best places, the ones with 
slimmer publication records either get tenured in lower-ranked schools, or leave academia. In a 
competition, if something makes the task harder for anyone, there might be winners and losers, 
but it cannot be that everyone ends up in a lower rank than otherwise. What this means in our 
context is that if FRTs were shorter and young faculty could get more publications by the time 
they are up for tenure, the tenure committees would have required more publications in order to 
get tenure. Consequently, the average untenured professor is not less likely to get tenure with 
long FRTs than with shorter FRTs but higher expectations.  
The long FRTs, however, do hurt untenured faculty somewhat; not in getting tenure, but 
in putting them in a disadvantage compared to tenured faculty (in addition to the obvious 
disadvantage…). Untenured faculty have little time to produce several publications, and because 
of the high rejection rates of top journals, they should adopt an impatient submission strategy and 
go down the list of journals (in terms of their quality) relatively quickly. It is a risky strategy for 
untenured faculty to submit a paper to several top general journals before starting to submit it to 
several top field journals and then to lower-quality journals if the paper is still rejected. This 
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strategy is risky because the author can find himself without enough publications by the time of 
his tenure decision (for a formal model that analyzes optimal submission strategy, see Azar, 
2005).  
Tenured faculty, on the other hand, have much less time pressure, and can therefore go 
down the list of journals to which they submit more slowly. Because they can adopt a more 
patient submission strategy and try more top journals before giving up and submitting to lower-
quality journals, tenured faculty have better chances to publish in top journals, given a constant 
quality of the submitted paper. Thus, untenured faculty are at a disadvantage compared to 
tenured faculty.  
There is, however, a social cost related to the tenure process because of the long FRTs. 
Publication records are shorter than they could be with shorter FRTs, and papers that could 
already be published with shorter FRTs are still working papers. This makes it harder to evaluate 
the quality of these working papers (if they were published, the identity of the journal that 
published them would have provided an informative signal about their quality). This can result in 
two things: first, it might require more effort from the tenure committee and from people who 
write reference letters about the candidates for tenure. For example, they might have to read a 
few of the candidate’s working papers in order to evaluate them, instead of observing which 
journals published them (which could be the case with shorter FRTs). Second, less information 
implies that the process becomes more prone to mistakes, in both directions: denying tenure to 
people who are above the institution’s standards and vice versa.  
The above discussion suggests that the optimal FRT is lower when considering its 
implications on the tenure process than what it would be absent these implications. But it does 
not mean that these implications overweight completely the benefits to long FRTs, namely 
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deterring submissions of mediocre papers to good journals and thus reducing the costs of the 
refereeing system.  
5.3. Selfish Strategic Behavior and the Evolution of the Refereeing Delay 
A third interesting question is how the desire to avoid receiving too many refereeing 
requests affects the evolution of the refereeing delay. If one wants to minimize the number of 
refereeing requests he receives, being a slow referee can help him achieve this goal: editors will 
learn of his tardiness and will be less inclined to send him additional requests to referee in the 
future13; the referee will also have more papers waiting to be refereed on his desk, and will thus 
be able to refuse to additional refereeing requests with the excuse that he already has too many 
referee reports to write (assuming that referees use this excuse only when it is true). I believe, 
however, that such strategic behavior is uncommon. After all, someone who wants to minimize 
the effort he makes on refereeing activities can simply decline the refereeing requests he receives 
rather than be slow in returning the report.  
There are two main reasons that lead people to agree to refereeing requests despite the 
effort required. One is that they are altruistic and they realize that the review process is a public 
good to which one should contribute when asked to do so. The second reason is more selfish: 
they want to retain good relations with the editor; he might be asked one day to write a letter of 
reference about them, and he also can affect the outcome when they submit papers to this 
journal.  
                                                 
13 An interesting anecdote is that the editors of the Economic Journal in the early 1970s report that any referee who 
took more than 2 months to return his report was dropped from the list of referees, unless there was a good reason 
for the delay (Champernowne, Deane and Reddaway, 1973); today an economics journal with a similar policy is 
likely to find itself with very few referees… 
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If the referee agrees because he is altruistic, then he probability realizes that contributing 
to the academic community requires not only writing referee reports, but also writing them in a 
timely manner. If the referee agrees because he wants to retain good relations with the editor, he 
also understands that being very slow will annoy the editor and can hurt him in the future. Those 
for whom neither reason is important (they are neither altruistic nor do they value good relations 
with the editor), should simply refuse to referee rather than be very slow. They will save 
themselves a lot of effort, and even the author and the journal will be better off.  
It might still be the case that because of such considerations of not being a referee who is 
too good (and therefore receives many refereeing requests), people will be slower than 
otherwise. There are two main ways to represent such behavior in the model, depending on what 
assumptions we have regarding this behavior. If we assume that people will choose refereeing 
delays very close to the norm so that they are not much faster than others, this can be captured by 
a higher value of m than otherwise.14 If we assume, however, that people will be slower because 
of strategic considerations regardless of the norm, this can be captured by a higher value of v. In 
the latter case it is clear that this strategic behavior will lead to a longer norm of refereeing delay 
(and a longer FRT). If the FRT is already longer than the optimal FRT even without strategic 
behavior, it follows that this strategic behavior increases the difference between the optimal and 
the actual FRT and thus reduces social welfare.  
If the trade-off between avoiding too many refereeing requests and keeping good 
relations with the editor (or altruistic motivations) is such that the optimal behavior is always to 
be slightly slower than the norm, we can have a situation where everyone tries to be a little 
                                                 
14 Notice, however, that a higher value of m also implies that people who tend to choose a refereeing delay higher 
than the norm will now want to choose closer to the norm.  
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slower than the norm, this results in the norm becoming longer, people then choose a delay 
slightly longer than the new norm, and so on. In this case the refereeing delay can become longer 
and longer even without any increase in the optimal delay.  
While such strategic behavior possibly contributed to the slowdown in the FRT since the 
1960s, there are several reasons why it does not seem to be the major reason for the slowdown. 
First, it requires that the optimal behavior for most people is to be slower than the norm, 
something that is not obvious given that both altruistic motivations and retaining good relations 
with the editor are reasons to be a fast referee. Second, why didn’t strategic behavior cause a 
similar slowdown in refereeing in other disciplines, such as physics?  
Finally, if this is a major reason for the slowdown, why did the slowdown start only in 
the 1960s? Champernowne, Deane and Reddaway (1973), for example, report that between 
January 1, 1971 and June 13, 1972, the Economic Journal obtained 286 referee reports, of which 
158 were written in less than 3 weeks. Marshall (1959) sent questionnaires to editors of 30 
economics journals, and received usable answers from 26 journals. Out of these 26 journals, 
Marshall reports that “Twenty-three editors reported that they gave notification one way or the 
other within 1 to 2 months, and only 2 editors reported a time-lag of as much as 4 months or 
more.” If editors could make a decision in 1-2 months, including the time it takes to mail the 
paper to and from the referees and the time it takes editors to choose referees and read their 
reports, this means that referees were very quick, writing a report in less than a month. 
Presumably, referees in the 1930s did not write reports much faster than the referees in the 
1960s. It then requires an explanation, if referees have an incentive to be slower than the norm 




 The review process in economics is an important research topic since insights about it can 
help us improve the process and increase the productivity of economists and other scholars. 
Previous research suggested that the optimal and the actual FRT both increased over the last few 
decades (Azar, 2004b). This article suggests a theoretical analysis of how the two changes may 
be related, using a model of social norm evolution that can also be applied to other contexts. The 
model describes how the refereeing time reacts to changes in the optimal FRT, taking into 
account the various preferences of referees, including their desire to conform to the social norm. 
The model suggests that even referees who do not care about the optimal FRT increase their 
refereeing time because of the change in the social norm.  
 When the optimal FRT increases and as a result the norm about how much time it should 
take to referee a paper also increases, the existence of the social norm seems to reinforce the 
increase in refereeing time, and therefore to be welfare improving. The model, however, suggests 
the surprising result that under a reasonable condition, the average refereeing time is in fact 
longer in the absence of a social norm, and consequently the existence of a social norm reduces 
social welfare.  
 In the conclusion of his recent article about the slowdown in submit-accept times of 
economics journals, Ellison (2002a, p. 989-990) discusses directions for future research, writing, 
“What future work do I see as important? … On the theory side, there is surely much more to be 
said on why social norms might change.” Ellison then adds, “The most important unresolved 
issue is surely the welfare consequences of the journal review process.” I agree with Ellison, and 
this article addresses these two issues, among other things. But there is surely more work to be 
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